Forensic science

I. Definitively identify and label the various aspects of biohazards, as they relate to criminal
activity, that a forensic practitioner may encounter. Students will be versed in the methodologies
of addressing situations where infectious agents are left incidentally at crime scenes, as well as
those hazards intentionally introduced as a result of the employment of biological weapons
resulting from terrorists activities.
The following story is a fictional account associated with the mythical Democratic-Republican
National Convention (DRNC) event in Miami, Florida. The story is loosely based on an
amalgamation of real life occurrences in the lead up to the Free Trade Area of the Americas
conference in Miami, Florida in 2003. The names of all the characters in the story are fictional.

Background
For the DRNC event, Miami-Dade County has formed a Host Committee, similar to the model
used for the Super Bowl Host Committees of the past. The Host Committee is a small group of
15 appointed personnel from various county and municipal agencies, as well as the private
sector. Miami-Dade Police Department Director Melanie Duncan is one of the committee
members. The Host Committee is chaired by Mr. Horace Copeland, a long-time assistant to the
County Manager, Miguel Herrera. The purpose of the Host Committee is to plan for the overall
event. As such, they are responsible for recommending policy, but not for enacting policy. The
enactment of policy remains the ultimate responsibility of the Board of County Commissioners
(BOCC).
The Democratic-Republican National Party (DRNP) has designated Ms. Cassandra Armand as
its chair of the DRNC’s Committee on Arrangements (COA). The COA is the main organizer
from the DRNP for this event. Ms. Armand and Mr. Copeland from the Host Committee work
hand-in-hand to plan this event and their recommendations to the BOCC carry considerable
weight for policy formulation.
Miami-Dade Police has been designated as the lead local agency and lead operational planner
for the event security. This policy differs significantly from the 2003 FTAA in which the City of
Miami was designated as the lead local agency.
Since this event meets the criteria of a National Special Security Event (NSSE), the U.S. Secret
Service has been designated as the lead coordinating agency with overarching statutory
authority for the planning and execution of the event. Supervisory Special Agent Samantha
Salerno has been appointed as the lead agent in-charge for the event.
Neither the Miami Police Department (MPD), nor Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) has
the forensic assets adequate to handle such a large-scale event by themselves. It would take
some degree of shared responsibility between MPD and MDPD, as well as some of the 30+
other incorporated areas such as Miami Beach, Hialeah, and Coral Gables. Due to the influx of
tens of thousands of delegates, visitors, and protestors, it is expected that the forensic
processing and evidence retention for a mass number of assaults, larcenies and other crimes
will increase considerably during the week of the event. It is clear that a multi-agency approach
such as the ones used for the 2003 FTAA Conference, the 2004 Presidential Debates, and the
Super Bowls of 2007 and 2010 must be employed for this large-scale special event as well.
Organization charts of the Security & Public Safety Subcommittee, as well as from the 2007
Super Bowl are provided for your reference.

The Story
In the year 2001, a week after the September 11 coordinated attacks by al Qaida against the
Word Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon, a series of letters containing weaponized anthrax
powder were mailed to several recipients throughout the United States. Letters are sent to
various print media companies such as the New York Post, the National Enquirer, as well as
television networks ABC, NBC, and CBS (WJLA, 2001).
A second wave of letters containing weapons-grade anthrax powder was sent out two weeks
later. In total, 22 people became ill after being exposed to the powder, resulting in five deaths
(DHS, 2013).
An already skittish nation recoiled at the possibility that these anthrax incidents may have been
a related second wave of terrorist attacks… this time with an insidious biological weapon. For
several weeks afterward, a great deal of media coverage focused on the anthrax attack. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that they received 2,229 media
inquiries about anthrax and 287 related to bioterrorism from October 4th through October 18th
(Thomas, 2003). These numbers are considered to be an underestimation of the actual number
of media inquiries received by that agency alone.
Law enforcement and emergency management agencies throughout the nation were also
inundated with similar inquires and with calls for service to respond to suspected anthrax.
Miami-Dade County was no different. During the weeks that followed the initial reports of the
anthrax deaths, hundreds of calls for service were received from people who were worried that
they had been exposed to anthrax laden mail. Some of the calls received by the 9-1-1 system
came from concerned citizens who wanted to report suspicious behavior of their neighbors.
Some worried individuals with minor flu symptoms were flooding the emergency rooms and
walk-in clinics throughout the county. Other calls for service had to do with various forms of
unspecified powders that had been found by hyper-vigilant individuals. More often than not, the
suspect powders turned out to be artificial sweeteners accidentally spilled on kitchen counters,
or narcotics such as heroin and cocaine, or a number of other inert materials that had been
carelessly left out in the open to be discovered by individuals in a heightened state of alert. To
say the least, the weeks following the initial news of the anthrax deaths posed a great challenge
to law enforcement, health, and emergency management agencies throughout the county, and
the entire nation.
Bearing the brunt of the calls for service were the region’s bomb squads and crime scene
investigations units of the various police agencies, as well as the Hazmat units of the fire-rescue
departments. At the time there were no response protocols and law enforcement/emergency
management agencies had no idea of how to respond to these types of calls for service. It
seems odd that bomb squads would respond to a possible biological substance call. But at the
time, nobody else was remotely capable or trained to respond to these types of situations. At
least, the bomb squad personnel had received some basic training on biological threats, and
they were also adept at handling difficult challenges in a very slow and methodical manner.
Perhaps bomb squads were not the ideal responders to calls involving possible biological
threats, but at the time there was no one else better trained, or better equipped. At least, bomb
squad personnel had Level A and B personal protective equipment (PPE) that others in law
enforcement were not equipped with at the time.
It took a month or so before the public hysteria on the anthrax threat eventually subsided.
Things got back to normal, and the anthrax-related calls for service mostly went away. Bomb
squads, Hazmat teams, and crime scene investigations units were able to return to the things
that they normally do. It was during this return to normalcy time that policy makers decided to
address the issue of response to biological weapons. Clearly, the police and emergency
management agencies had been caught flat-footed, and a huge gap in the capabilities to
respond to such calls had been revealed. The subsequent months had numerous meetings and
brainstorming sessions among subject matter experts from various related fields, including
bomb squads, Hazmat, crime scene, hospital emergency personnel, and experts in biological
weapons.
As a result of the meetings and brainstorming sessions that involved interdisciplinary groups,
several tabletop exercises were designed to test region’s emergency response the capabilities
in future biological-related incidents. The tabletop exercises simulated both naturally occurring
pandemic conditions, as well as terrorist-related biological weapon dispersion scenarios.
Through these tabletop exercises, several issues were identified.
Perhaps the most pressing issue had to do with early identification and recognition of the
problem. Unlike chemical, radiological, or explosive weapons of mass destruction, the onset of
the effects of biological weapons is difficult to detect. There are no loud and destructive
explosions to alert everyone of the onset. The initial indications of a biological weapons attack
can be as imperceptible as a few patients checking themselves in at local emergency rooms
and walk-in clinics. Peoples arriving at hospitals with flu-like symptoms at first appear to be no
different than the regular day-to-day traffic of patients coming in to see a doctor. Typically,
whether it is a natural pandemic, or a terrorist-related biological WMD release, the scope of the
biological agent’s effect will probably not be known for several days, if not weeks.

Assignment Instructions
For the purpose of this assignment, you are playing the role of Major Susan Barker, the
commander of the Crime Scene Investigations Bureau of the Miami-Dade Police Department
(MDPD). MDPD Director Melanie Duncan has appointed you as the chairperson of the Crime
Scene Investigations Workgroup under the Security & Public Safety Subcommittee in
preparation for the DRNC special event. The organizational structure for the Security & Public
Safety Subcommittee will mirror the one used for the 2007 Super Bowl. Your Crime Scene
Investigations Workgroup can be seen highlighted in bright yellow on the attached org chart.
Your job is to convene the Crime Scene Investigations Workgroup and come up with ways to
identify the key issues associated with a potential biological WMD agent. You must address
these key issues and formulate a plan of action that addresses the threat of biological weapons
during the DRNC.
In this assignment, you will prepare a written document (1,200 words per the written exercise
instructions) that identifies the key issues associated with a biological agent release during the
DRNC event, and provides guidelines for crime scene investigations personnel responding to
the incident